In this article, the author examines the socio-legal conception of Eugen Ehrlich and its relation to state law and judicial law enforcement. The attention is focused on the practical implications of this conception on the functioning of judicial systems. Analyzing the criticism raised against Ehrlich's conception, the author emphasizes that this thinker stood on a scientific platform which did not necessitate any strict distinction between the factual and the normative -between Is and Ought -considering any attempt to draw a net distinction between societal phenomena as pointless. Ehrlich sought to enlarge the province of jurisprudence through the application of sociological methods to the factual material from which arise social institutions. These institutions crystallize social practices into rules of behaviour, but this crystallization does not happen automatically. It requires an intellectual reconstruction of these practices by the actors acting in the legal order.
explicit and unambiguous reservations are missing. At best, Ehrlich was ready to accept that the influence of state law grows according to the intensification of solidarity: "the fact that state law is manifestly gaining ground is merely the expression of the intensified solidarity of society". 9 It sounds as if he was unaware that to make state law dependent on the "intensification of solidarity" means to make it depend on living law (which is the immediate manifestation of social solidarity). Wherefrom it results that the latter precedes the former both temporarily and logically -this inference (which is quite evident even if Ehrlich did not formulate it explicitly) expectedly gave rise to a rigorous criticism. In the subsequent works (published after the Grundlegung), Ehrlich seemed to be well informed about this danger (particularly stressed in the Kelsen-Ehrlich debates) and introduced numerous caveats like: "One must not, however, conclude from this that there is no such thing as state law, that is to say, law created by the state through legislation. The state brings law into existence by creating institutions through its power of compulsion… and provides them with a legal regulation". 10 From the perspective of these later works, it is questionable whether Ehrlich, as Jeremy Webber asserts, "stressed upon the alienation of state law from the rules of conduct within a society". 11 Should we take the above-cited phrases from the Grundlegung with the 5 Jeremy Webber, "Naturalism and Agency in the Living Law", in: M. Hertogh (ed.) Living Law: Reconsidering Eugen Ehrlich, pp. 201-222, at p. 206. 6 Ibid. 7 Jeremy Webber argues that "Ehrlich's arguments for the insufficiency of state law -his attempts, in other words, to remove state law from the centre of legal theory -are very well taken" (Ibid., p. 212). For justice's sake, it needs to be mentioned that Ehrlich added in his Grundlegung some provisos about the respective role of the state law in social development. E.g.: "Scientific and judge-made law everywhere surpasses statute law in wealth of material, adaptability, and mobility; but in more advanced stages of development mankind is brought face to face with a number of problems of legal life that can be satisfactorily dealt with only by the state" (Eugen Ehrlich, Fundamental Principles of the Sociology of Law, p. 184). 8 Ibid., p. 391-411. 9 Ibid., p. 155. 10 Eugen Ehrlich, "The Sociology of Law", p. 136. 11 Jeremy Webber, "Naturalism and Agency in the Living Law", p. 212.
How could one draw at least a provisional line of differentiation between state and social law, if it is possible at all? Efficiency and social importance cannot provide any criterion. The official law can in some situations even to go ahead of other kinds of law and be more efficient, which means: be congruent with social development. Neither sanction can serve as a criterion for distinction, as other social norms (etiquette, ethics, decorum…) are also coercive; they "would be quite meaningless if they did not exercise a certain amount of coercion". 22 Each way of making the distinction also has two versions: whether the difference lies in the way the law regulates its subject matter or in the subject matter itself. Ehrlich took the former view, holding that official (state) law is evidently one of the 'social orders', and represents only a phase in the dialectics of law as social phenomenon. This stance is starkly evident when Ehrlich extends the social law beyond the realm of the inner social orders and admits that norms of the state law are 'social' in their content: "These norms are made 16 Ehrlich defines state law as "created by the state, not indeed as to its form, but as to its content; it is law that came into being solely through the state, and that could not exist without the state" (Eugen Ehrlich, Fundamental Principles of the Sociology of Law, p. 137). 17 The two terms "social law" and "living law" are used by Ehrlich as equivalent and interchangeable ones (sometimes he also refers to the term 'scientific law' which points out at the methodologically correct procedures of finding the law). However, they can be separated from other standpoints. For instance, Georges Gurvitch developed his famous conception of social law in contract to Ehrlich's conception of living law. Characterizing Ehrlich's ideas, Gurvitch intentionally avoids using the term "social law", and translates "gesellschaftliches Recht" (social law) as "droit de la Société" (law of the society) (Georges Gurvitch, Le temps présent et l'idée du droit social. Paris, 1931, p. 264-278) to distinguish his own conception against the background of Ehrlich's sociology of law. 18 Hans Kelsen, "Eine Grundlegung der Rechtssoziologie", p. 9. 19 Ibid, p. 14. 20 Ehrlich, Eugen, "Entgegnung", in: H. Kelsen, E. Ehrlich, Rechtssoziologie und Rechtswissenschaft. Eine Kontroverse (1915 Kontroverse ( /1917 , p. 57. 21 This understanding of this sociological conception of Ehrlich was shared not only by Kelsen. One can again mention Georges Gurvitch, who writes that "Ehrlich make it apparent that the most important problem for him is that of the living law created outside the scope of legislative activities, this problem being concentrated in the phenomenon of the law of the society (gesellschaftliches Recht) opposed both to the state law, and to the law created by the judges and by the juristic doctrine" (Georges 24 The difference is rather due to the polisemious meaning of the word "law" which implies both spontaneous factual order of relations between human beings, the commands of state authorities, societal institutions, and legal science. 25 The reader of the Grundlegung can perceive hesitations of its author between the intention to reserve this word only for institutions directly engendered by society, and the counterintention to use this word also for the state-centred rules and structures. This vacillation might be one of the major reasons for misunderstanding the key ideas of his sociology of law.
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Reassessing the distinction between state law, juristic law, and living law, Javier
Trevino rightly comments that "Ehrlich's distinction holds simply that all law is made of the same material as social life at large". 27 The material of law is the same in different realms of the social reality, be it inner orders of social groups, state organisations, or routine interactions guided by a sense of justice. In fact, the central place of the Grundlegung is occupied by living law, in the background of Ehrlich's theory stands juristic law, and state law is examined only insofar as it has importance for the characterization of both aforementioned kinds of law.
This scheme has undergone a serious critical examination in the literature because of the alleged prevalence of living law over both juristic law and state law. 28 Ehrlich's position was that of scepticism, or at least, inattention toward state law -as a matter of fact, this is the first impression which remains after lecture of the Grundlegung 23 Ibid., p. 152. 24 Ibid., p. 188. 25 These dialectics cannot be adequately translated through the difference between 'statute' (Gesetz) and 'law' (Recht), as Ehrlich repeatedly insists that state law is not identical to statutory law (Ibid., p. 137 ff. where Ehrlich concentrates himself on investigation of the customary law, the ancient law (especially, the Roman law which was the hobbyhorse of Ehrlich, along with the medieval law of England and of Germany). State law is evoked only when the author needed to show that "the vulgar, state-centred conception of law" is wrong in considering state law as the primary or even the sole source of valid legal rules. One can easily explain this lack of attention, addressing the famous epigraph to the Grundlegung: "The centre of gravity of legal development lies not in legislation, not in juristic science, nor in judicial decision, but in society itself". 29 Ehrlich is quite eloquent about his objectives pursued in this volume -he attacks the statist conception of law which reduces all law to that issued or recognised by the state. This is the neuralgic point of his magnum opus.
To substantiate his position, which nowadays does not look radical at all, Ehrlich thoroughly examines customary and trade law, doctrine, juridical and judicial practice of various époques and countries -all his findings expose the fraud of the statist conception of law. There is even no need to refer to any particular passage of the Grundlegung to indicate these findings -any page opened at random would yield a direct or indirect conclusion of the author in favour of this position. In the most condensed form, these considerations can be found in the corresponding chapters of the Grundlegung where the author deals with the correlation between the state and the law. 30 The conception of living law is, to a considerable extent, also a part of this general project. Ehrlich insists on the independence of this law: "The living law is the law which dominates life itself even though it has not been posited in legal
propositions. The source of our knowledge of this law is, first, the modern legal document;
secondly, direct observation of life, of commerce, of customs and usages and of all associations, not only those that the law has recognised but also of those that it has overlooked and passed by, indeed even of those that it has disapproved". 31 Ehrlich is mostly known in the English-speaking world as the author of the sympathized even earlier. 41 What was the reason of this scandalous success of the
Grundlegung, and what factors motivated Kelsen and other lawyers to ruthlessly attack
Ehrlich after the publication of this book?
It should be mentioned here that the main scientific project of Ehrlich was to introduce applied empirical methods into the training of law students. Ehrlich formulated this major task in his 1906 inauguration speech as rector at the Chernowitz University, 42 and already in 1909 a new teaching course, "Living Law", was listed on the curriculum of that University. 43 After the organisational failure of the empirical research project in Bukovina,
Ehrlich was discouraged to the point of denying any heuristical value of empirical research in law. 44 Meanwhile, the legal community of the Austro-Hungarian Empire kept ignoring the new components Ehrlich wanted to add into the stream of the Freie Rechtsfindung movement.
The harsh, ironical and to certain extent categorical 45 tonality of the Grundlegung can be explained not so much by the exorbitant pretentions of Ehrlich, but rather by his anger with the long-lasting silence of the legal community of his country 46 and with his resolution to wake this community up.
If this was the objective pursued by Ehrlich when on Christmas Eve of 1912 he
finalized his Grundlegung, this objective was attained -sociolegal studies have acquired the status of a scientific discipline and gained some more attention in Europe, the US, and in Japan. 47 The Grundlegung became a kind of "visiting card" for Ehrlich, and in the following 40 45 Nonetheless, Ehrlich does not employ anywhere in the Grundlegung such words as "ever", "never", "always", and abstains from final judgments about life of the law and the role of living law in it. Carefully read, this book of Ehrlich does not allow for concluding that Ehrlich pretended that his findings would yield universal or definite answers, although the bitterness of feeling ignored can be traced between the lines of it. It might be that Ehrlich conceived this book as a kind of "marketing action" to draw the attention to sociolegal studies and to prove their applicability, hoping to provide clearer and more accurate analysis in the consequent parts of the planned trilogy. 46 Many researchers insisted that Ehrlich's work drew more attention in the US, Japan and some other countries outside the German-speaking world where this work remained unrecognized over many years (Stefan Vogl, "Eugen Ehrlich's Linking of Sociology and Jurisprudence and the Reception of his Work in Japan", p. 109-115). 47 years, advantages and disadvantages of his scientific project were estimated chiefly across the ideas the author exposed in it. But Ehrlich became a victim of his success. Ehrlich had formulated some "extravagant" (for the state-centred mentality of lawyers of his époque) theses without sufficient argumentation. An avalanche of negative responses followed the publication of the book. The most annihilating criticism was formulated by Hans Kelsen who, in the opinion of many researchers, won the debates with the author of the Grundlegungthis result was disastrous for the development of the entire sociology of law discipline. 48 Some passages of the Grundlegung indicated that Ehrlich gave an evident preference to social law, priming it over official law, which logically would lead the author to consider the former as legally valid in case of conflicts with the latter, whose validity is thus called into One of the advantages of the statist vision of law resides in its seeming ability to clearly define the borderline of law which more or less coincides with sovereign will. Once this vision is abandoned, other criteria are needed to identify the subject area of legal studies and to delimit it from those of religion or ethics. Ehrlich was clearly at pains to cope with this question, and hardly believed that there might be any definite identification. In his paper of 1911 he wrote that "each lawyer knows that it is impossible to draw a distinction between morality and law: something which yesterday has been morality, today becomes law -law is the morality of yesterday". 54 Ehrlich is even more ardent in one of the subsequent papers: "I leave to those who can waste their time for a fruitless terminology to decide whether we deal with law or with morality". 55 In the Grundlegung: "Generally speaking, the extra-legal norms of morality, ethical custom, and decorum become legal norms so readily that in most cases a differentiation is altogether impossible". 56 He stresses that "in view of the present state of the science of the law, it is difficult to indicate precisely" where the legal norm differs from other norms, and therefore it is impossible "to state the difference between law and morality in a brief, simple formula in the manner of the juristic science that has hitherto been current". associations, bears the stamp of an order of domination, of conflict". 65 Here again, no factual or even analytical opposition between state law and social law is implied.
Another typical misunderstanding is connected with the asserted lack of differentiation between Is and Ought, between facts and norms, between the social and the legal -an accusation first formulated by Hans Kelsen. 66 Ehrlich did his best to dismiss the interpretation of his conception from the perspective of the Is-Ought divide, emphasizing that this divide is not fruitful when examining the social reality of law. He also insisted that negation of an original character and the omnipotence of state law does not necessarily mean negation or disparagement of this law. Ehrlich was neither so short-sighted to ignore the extent to which the official law is capable of restructuring social life, nor inclined to draw a clear-cut borderline between various manifestations (kinds) of law, because he believed that there could be no such simple line in the social reality (although, "it is impossible to deny the existence of this difference" 67 ).
Certain passages of the Grundlegung could lead to accusing its author of mixing facts with norms. 68 Ehrlich was furious with such accusations to the point of considering himself offended ("called a fool"). 69 The main reason for these accusations is that Ehrlich describes certain "facts of law" (Tatsachen des Rechts) which regulate social relations immediately, without intermediary of any institutions or written codes. He clarifies his position in "Die juristische Logik" where he argues that the task of the sociology of law is to establish facts but not to evaluate them. On the one hand, given that conflict-resolution necessarily implies evaluation, judges are not required to apply facts instead of the legislative norms when resolving cases. 70 Rebuking "the vulgar, state-centred conception of law", 71 On the other hand, Ehrlich could not accept the deductivist image of law enforcement where the judge is thought to automatically extract decisions from norms. Following the direction of R. von Jhering, Ehrlich tried to discover certain societallaw (Rechtssätzen 74 ), which were putatively pursued by the lawmakers, 75 and fill possible gaps in legal regulation with reference to these interests. From this angle, Ehrlich's sociology of law did not propose to challenge the legal validity of official law when admitting the possibility of its confrontation with living or juristic law -the ultimate purpose of the sociology of law was to bind the judges and other law enforcement agents with the "real will" of the legislator. 76 This "real will" is to be ascertained not through metaphysical speculations (about final ends of the law or objective laws of history…), but through a sociological investigation of empirical facts.
Law enforcement in the context of Ehrlich's legal sociology
For Ehrlich, rules of law were not lifeless constructions which existed independently of the social reality. On the contrary, they are parts of the "living", i.e. functioning and effective order of social communications, which protect certain interests privileged by society 77 and discriminates those interests that are denounced and disapproved by society.
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Society itself engenders a general order of societal relations, which later is put into legal forms by social groups and individuals who act thereby in the capacity of lawmakers (in the broader meaning, as specified above). The facts of law (usage, domination, possession and declaration of will) are described by this legal scholar as societal relations "crystallized" into certain practice and vested by the human mind with legal meaning. 84 But if Ehrlich constantly repeats the célèbre diction of Jhering about "the normative force of the factual", he is far from implying that facts are coercive themselves, without a social authority intervening and establishing the appropriate social institutions. "Force" can be interpreted here as a pressure that social environment exerts on lawmakers, as a feeling of necessity that is experienced by judges, parliament members, and other people empowered in this legal order to issue rules of law. It is this "force" that pushes lawmakers to confer legal protection on some of societal relations, and to strip other relations of such protection. Not every relation, and not every interest achieves legal protection. It is contingent that they are considered as socially relevant and valuable, that this way they will become facts of law. Many interests can "remain at least initially, some even permanently, outside of the law fixed in rules of law". 85 The final say about conferring protection on such interests belongs to the competent authorities. They can either act at their discretion or be duped by some metaphysical ideals. The best they can do is to make use of the "scientific method of jurisprudence", to wit: the sociology of law outlined by Ehrlich. This "scientific method" can be laid out in the following manner of investigation of the prevailing interests: 86 first, "there appears certain social interest which tends to be valid in a concrete situation"; then, this interest "gradually gets crystallized…, obtains a status of socially recognized and melts into the form of custom, possession or declaration of will"; and only in the last instance are some interests fixed in rules of law (those of state law, juristic law, precedents, customs…).
Therefore, the creation of rules of law out of social practices "requires that further intellectual effort be applied to the latter; for we must extract from them that which is universally valid and state it in a proper manner.
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It was evident for Ehrlich that "a mass of social interests… remain (at least, initially and some of them -constantly) outside the law and its rules". 88 The thinker stresses that "the legal institutions existing in society can form the legal order irrespectively of their being regulated by rules of law. These institutions depend on rules of law (especially, on the laws) only insofar as these rules are capable to determine, how they are to be assessed by the judge, specifically whether the judge has to provide protection to conflicting interests possibly contained in them". 89 In other words, if the judge finds that some relations or interests are worth being protected, but in fact are not, his duty is to redefine the scope of legal protection, taking into consideration not only the wording of the corresponding rules of law, but also the juristic doctrine, ideas, and feeling of justice which prevail in the society. In this way, the judge does not act on his own, but exercises the will of lawmakers (insofar as the judge can read this will from the societal practice). In contrast to Francois Gény and other representatives of the movement of free finding of the law who believed that the jurist should check his abstractions against an intuitive appreciation of living reality, Ehrlich insists that there are some objective limits of judicial discretion. And this is for several reasons.
Firstly, judicial discretion is admissible only in situations where interests are not legally balanced: neither directly, nor indirectly. This means that no rules of law are applicable and that no clear hierarchy of the related interests can be constructed on the base of the acting rules of law. Even in these situations, the judge is to "balance the interests pursuant to the order set out in rules of law". 90 The task of the judge is to reveal sociological facts, attesting to the existence of certain interests, and to find a place for them among other legally (i.e. by rules of law) protected interests. In the absence of applicable rules of law, the judge creates a "norm for decision" [Entscheidungsnorm] from the existing legal and sociological material and which is only relevant for the case in question. The "norm of decision" can be in conflict with other norms and rules of this legal order -formally, this contradiction rules out the validity of this norm and its further application, though political and other constellations can be favourable to the survival of this norm. If the criterion of adequacy is met, the decision and the appropriate "norm for decision" which was applied to arrive at this decision can be considered as just. This "just decision" and the underpinning norm remain only "an initiative of a lawyer" which has to go through "a battle of opinions" to become a rule of law -and this means, to be integrated into the legal order.
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Secondly, judicial finding of the law is not derived from intuition. Ehrlich was far from the assertions of Hermann Kantorowicz and other leaders of the free finding of the law movement, who believed that judicial opinions are fully discretionary acts only ornamented with legal arguments after the actual decision had been taken based on a judge's intuitions.
Ehrlich agrees that a judicial decision can result from discretion or intuitive insight, specifying at the same time that nothing hinders a judge from replacing her/his convictions by a firm scientific knowledge based on facts. To arrive to a scientifically plausible decision, the judge has to find and compare the conflicting interests with those protected by the rules of law. The common denominator for evaluation is therefore the concept of interest, as "a legal norm that does not protect an interest against encroachment is not a rule of law or at least no complete rule of law". 92 The sociology of law can be particularly helpful here to demonstrate that the received beliefs and convictions which might intuitively be felt as "objectively correct and purposeful", in fact, can be socially inadequate. This comparison of interests yields a measure for determining their relative valuethe judge is to make sure that "the interest which seeks protection before the court does not diverge from the interest which was balanced and fixed in the rule of law". 94 Although, the interests defended by the lawmakers at the time they had formulated the rule of law cannot be identical to those interests which are brought by litigants before the court some time ago. The situation is more or less clear when the concerned interest either contradicts that protected by a rule of law, or complies with it. The judge's duty is either to dismiss the petition or to allow it: : "Since it is the function of the sociological science of law, like that of every other science, to record facts, not to evaluate them, it cannot possibly, as some have believed, tend to establish, at the present stage of human development, a doctrine which might enable the judge to violate his judicial oath".
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It can turn out that the interests of litigants are not congruent with those fixed in rules of law. In this case the judge may not deny the access to justice for the reason that there is no corresponding rule to settle the conflict, and has to resolve the case even in the absence of such rules. At the same time, the judge may not dismiss or allow the claim solely at his discretion: "as long as the judge interprets the rule of law he has to refer to the interests of expediency of its creator not to his own interests of expediency". 96 The dilemma between the intention of the judge and the intention of the lawmaker can be avoided, as believed Ehrlich, through "balancing independently the conflicting interests and granting the protection of the courts to the interest he deems as the higher one". 97 And still, it is not the "force" of an interest which is decisive here (as taught Jhering) -a scientifically accurate balancing shall be based on the investigation of the societal context in which the lawmaker introduced the corresponding legal text. In a case when no relevant text exists in the legal order, the judge has to determine the moment from which the interest matured to the extent to be eligible for legal protection. Here a delicate nuance can be felt between the position of Ehrlich and that adopted in Swiss Civil Code, article 4 of which prescribes the judge to act in place of lawmakers in case of gaps in law. Ehrlich did not go so far, limiting the judge with rather instrumental, and not creative, function. if to admit that there is a legally perfect (full, consistent and irredundant) set of legal norms, it will quickly become outdated, lagging behind the pace of life. The judge neither can stop this societal development, nor may abstain from the application of the previously established rules of law which could have already become obsolete by the moment they must be applied.
Standing before this dilemma, the judge has to reconcile fluidity of social life with rigidity of rules of law -this is possible by revealing and analyzing the interests initially pursued by lawmakers, and comparing them with those conflicting in the case which lies before the judge. If the judge finds that the lawmakers had tried to protect certain societal interests but failed to do it because of imperfect wording of the rule of law in question, the judge is called to overcome the literal meaning of this rule and to provide a relief for the interest which had to be protected. Here, again, the judge does not act discretionally, but is to utilize the methods of "scientific research", i.e. of the sociology of law "teaching the judges to apply the law". 100 Here lies a distinction important for understanding the argumentation of Ehrlich -that of a rule (Regel or Satz) and a norm. The scholar explains that a legal rule is "precise, universally binding formulation of the legal precept in a book of statutes or in a law book", and a legal norm is "the legal command, reduced to practice, as it obtains in a definite association" (Eugen Ehrlich, Fundamental Principles of the Sociology of Law, p. 38). Furthermore, he insists that "there are rules that are not norms because they do not refer to the social life of human beings: e.g. the rules of language, of taste, or of hygiene" (Ibid., p. 39, emphasis added). The distinction is far from being evident. But it imposes a nuanced difference between the terms describing the factual regularities (Regeln) and the linguistic expressions (Sätze), which do not possess binding force par excellence, on the one hand, and the norms (Normen) which "assign to each member of the social association his position and function" (Ibid, p. 169). It would be too simplistic to find here a clear-cut division between Is-propositions and Oughtnorms, as for Ehrlich these two spheres are interrelated and interdependent -there are some elements of normativity in Regeln and Sätzen. Analyzing the later works of Ehrlich, Vogl considers legal propositions [legal rules] in Ehrlich's legal sociology as "decisions of the legislator about a conflict of interests in general terms" (Stefan Vogl, "Eugen Ehrlich's Linking of Sociology and Jurisprudence and the Reception of his Work in Japan", p. 110), which evidently indicates at some normative (binding force) of these propositions (or better -rules). As well as there is the factual in Normen which "flow discrimination between the concrete description of legal configurations and the nomographic study of law" 101 or even in certain aspects for amalgamation of Is and Ought. 102 But a caveat must be added that Ehrlich stood on a different scientific platform which did not necessitate any strict distinction between the factual and the normative, for "our concepts are fashioned from the material which we take from tangible reality. They are always based on facts which we have observed". 103 As shown above, Ehrlich condemned any attempt to draw net distinctions between societal phenomena as pointless, pure metaphysics. In fact, this can lead some theorists to the conclusion (erroneous, as we believe) that Ehrlich's conception was in affinity with the utterly liberal positions close to the ideas of Friedrich Hayek who saw the main source of law in the spontaneous self-ordering of society 104 or even with anarchism.
Our normative knowledge is in reciprocity with and is inseparable from our knowledge about facts -this assertion does not undermine normativity of law. Ehrlich's aim was not to replace the commonly (at that time) accepted scheme of normativity of law by a chain of causality (which was wrongly supposed by Kelsen), but to add some factual material to better understand the social machinery of law and the origin of the binding force of its norms. Ehrlich's interest was concentrated rather on the situations of silence or dysfunction of the law -gaps, redundancy, collisions, unclear wording of legal rules… Here, in hard cases, the dominant Rechtswissenschaft of his time was almost of no use, and the sociology of law, as argued the Chernowitz professor, was the best designed to provide the scientific clues necessary for law enforcement agencies when the law kept silence. From this vantage point, there are no solid grounds to accuse Ehrlich of ignoring the official law and its role in society, as he was, contrariwise, confident that this role is determinant in contemporary complex societies. 105 A judge cannot avoid situations of normative ambiguity where no clear guidance will be available in books of law. 106 Seen as "the mouth that pronounces the words of the law" (Montesquieu), the judge in these situations will have either to protect the most influential interest or to resolve the case at his own discretion -both solutions imply subjectivity and political engagement, and for this reason evidently do not fit the idea of justice. To secure the realization of justice in societal practice, judges should take advantage of methods of sociological research which allow stating the actual trends of justice in society and comparing these trends with those existing at the time the applicable legal rules were adopted. This comparison leads to a correct balancing of the conflicting interests with a view to the values protected by the legal order. Albeit the judge extracts a "norm for decision" from the social practice (social facts), he does not resolve the case directly on the base of this practice (these facts): "the rule of law is derived by jurists and legislators by very intricate processes…". 107 The sociological data just help the judge to reveal the "real will" of the lawmaker who putatively would prefer to protect the conflicting interests in the same manner as those which were protected by him before. 108 This perspective is not "realist" properly said -Ehrlich does not propose to examine the factual impulsions which led the parliament members or other lawmakers to adopt certain acts (though this approach was often mistakenly attributed to him). These impulsions, if discovered by the judge, do not serve as guidance for him, even on the generalized levellike Volksgeist of the historical school of lawyers, or "social solidarity" in Durkheimian sociology. The judge cannot be discharged from his burden of responsibility for resolving cases according to the laws. 109 A just decision in hard cases can be found not through a literal analysis of the words of a statute, but through weighting and balancing interests on a scientific foundation, to wit: on the methodology of empirical sociology. A hundred years after
Grundlegung was published, the reconciliation of normative and empirical elements in the research of legal science is still far from being finished. 110 
